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THE MARITAL AND PHYSICIAN PRIVILEGES-
A REPRINT OF A LETTER TO A CONGRESSMAN
CHARLES L. BLACK, JR.*
Author's Introductory Note
I am much disturbed by the treatment given to "privilege," in
Moore and Bendix, "Congress, Evidence and Rulemaking."1  My dis-
turbance centers mainly on their treatment of the marital and physician
privileges.
As to the first of these (the marital privilege) I am surprised at
the seeming suggestion2 that the proposed Court Rules advocated
by Moore and Bendix (and rejected by Congress) pretty much sup-
ported the husband-wife privilege. Actually, -that privilege would have
been cut to the bone and into the bone by the Court Rules, leaving
only the most meager protection to the privacy of this most intimate
human relation.
But it is not such minor inaccuracies, or possible inaccuracies, that
bother me most. I am most bothered by the hidden major premises:
(1) that development of evidence in litigation outweighs virtually every
other interest in life, particularly the human interest in privacy; and
(2) even more, that all this is mostly a matter of technicalities about
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, and not a matter of the quality of life and
of its essential privacies.
In the following letter to Congressman Hungate, I tried to combat
these ideas. I think the letter may be worth reprinting3 now that some
of the dust is beginning to settle. Congress has enacted a set of evi-
dentiary rules incorporating the common law of testimonial privilege,4
but at least one state has adopted -the originally proposed rules of
privilege outright and in many others it is possible that those proposals
will have affected the common law in less obvious ways.
* B.A. 1935, M.A. 1938, University of Texas; LL.B. 1943, Yale; Member of New
York Bar; Henry R. Luce Professor of Jurisprudence, Yale Law School.
1. 84 YALE L.J. 9, 19-27 (1974).
2. Id. at 20 & n.50.
3. Ed. Note: This letter was originally printed in Hearings on Proposed Rules of
Evidence Before the Special Subcomm. on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., Ser. 2, at 240 (1973).
4. Ed. Note: Pub. L. No. 93-595, Rule 501, 43 U.S.L.W. 137 (Jan. 14, 1975).
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February 5, 1973
Honorable William L. Hungate
Chairman, Special Subcommittee on
Reform of Federal Criminal Laws
Committee on the Judiciary
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
My dear Congressman Hungate:
I have received a letter from Mr. Hoffman [Committee Counsel]
of 16 January, inviting my further comments on the proposed Rules
of Evidence for federal courts. In the hope that this letter will not
be too late for inclusion in the Record of Hearings, I shall somewhat
amplify the thoughts sketched in my letter of 9 January to Senator
Ervin, referred by him to your Committee.
My primary interest is in the constitutional position. I shall first
outline the nature of my general objection from the constitutional point
of view, and then say enough about the merits of a few particular rules
to connect them with the general constitutional difficulty which I fore-
see.
In outline, the trouble is: (1) that some of these Rules are sub-
ject to grave constitutional objection, either as a whole or in possible
applications; (2) that only the Supreme Court can or should decide
finally on the constitutional validity of each Rule, and of its only partly
foreseeable applications; (3) that the Court cannot adequately have
considered these hard and complex constitutional questions in the proc-
ess of approving this long set of Rules, and does not claim to have done
so; but (4) that the Court, if the Rules are now promulgated, will un-
doubtedly have compromised its position with respect -to the full and
judicially regular consideration of these issues, one by one, after the
manner of courts; in no other context would it be regarded as even
debatable whether the promulgator of rules should afterwards be .the
last resort judge of their constitutionality, as the constitutional issues
arise in cases. (Incidentally, the lower courts are put in an even more
difficult position in the same connection.)
The inference from this sequence of thought is that, if Congress
allows these Rules to become law, there will never have taken place
and never can take place any judicial consideration of their constitu-
tionality which is both plenary and uncompromised by prior commit-
ment. Here we have to do not with an arid philosophic question of
"separation of powers," but with a real and substantial confusion of
function at the very highest level, the level of constitutional decision.
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These points could be lengthily elaborated, but such elaboration
would amount only to an invocation, one by one, of the soundly settled
principles of constitutional adjudication (the real controversy, the par-
ties' relation of exigent adversity, the availability to the Court of help
from committed advocacy, the consideration of issues of law in a setting
of concrete fact, and so on) and one of the oldest principles of judicial
judgment in general-that the court not have committed or semi-com-
mitted itself before the case is heard. Such elaboration is unnecessary
when one writes for a Committee of lawyers. I cannot think that any
lawyer could, on full reflection, be satisfied with this way of dealing
with great constitutional issues.
I am fully aware that these objections apply in principle to every
case of rule-making by the Court. In every Rule of Procedure a due-
process question may lurk. I have to confess, moreover, that I myself
served for ten years on the Advisory Committee on Admiralty Rules
without bringing these objections into focus in my own mind. But I
think it natural, if regrettable, that objections of this sort should first
be seen clearly when something important is visibly at hazard; it is, in-
deed, the very weakness in human perception that underlies many of
the canons (just rehearsed) concerning the conditions of sound consti-
tutional adjudication.
There is something very important at stake in these Rules of Evi-
dence. At several points, they give major aid and comfort to that
diminishment of human privacy which is one of the greater evils of our
time, thus raising not only prime questions of value, but also questions
of constitutional law which could never have been dismissed as trivial,
but which are even more plainly substantial in the light of such recent
decisions as Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). I refer,
of course, to the treatment the Rules give to the marital and to the
physician-patient privileges.
I am not an expert on the law of evidence. The short discussion
which follows is not meant to be exhaustive, and cannot be learned,
but is meant only as a concretization of the claim that real and substan-
tial constitutional issues are being settled (or at least severely preju-
diced) in these Rules, in a manner fundamentally wrong-the claim,
in other words, that the progression of thought in my numbered points
above generates an objection not to mere procedural impropriety as
such but to the procedurally wrong handling of exceedingly important
interests and issues.
(Let me add that I neither know nor care how far the privacies
here at stake have already been invaded -by state rules of evidence.
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To any such matter, two objections are decisive, since they together
cover the whole ground. First, many state rules of evidence (even if
inveterate and certainly if innovatory) may themselves be seriously
questioned as violative of the national Constitution, and of the values
it embodies; the argument from them to federal constitutionality or to
desirability is a bootstraps argument, for it assumes their validity, as
against just -the same objections as those which would be levied against
the federal material if it be adopted. Secondly, Federal Rules are
leadership rules, and ought to lead in the right direction, which -to me
would be in the direction of greater rather than less protection of per-
sonal privacy; this leadership becomes -the more rather than the less
important if the States are now going in the wrong direction.)
Let me first consider the near-elimination of the marital-confi-
dentiality privilege (Rule 505).r There remains a narrow privilege in
proceedings where one spouse is a criminal defendant. Aside from
this, the meaning of the Rule (made entirely clear in the Advisory
Committee's comments) is that, however intimate, however private,
however embarrassing may be a disclosure by one spouse to another,
or some fact discovered, within the privacies of marriage, by one spouse
about another, that disclosure or fact can be wrung from the spouse
under penalty of 'being held in contempt of court, if it is thought barely
relevant -to the issues in anybody's lawsuit for breach of a contract to
sell a carload of apples. It ought -to be enough to say of such a rule
that it could easily-even often-force any decent person-anybody
any of us would want to associate with-either to lie or -to go to jail.
No rule can be good that has that consequence-that compels the
decent and honorable to evade or to disobey it. It seems clear 'to me
that this Rule trenches on the area of marital 'privacy so staunchly de-
fended by the Supreme Court, and especially by the late Mr. Justice
Harlan's concurrence, in Griswold v. Connecticut, supra; certainly it is
arguable that it does so. Even if Griswold had never been decided,
it would be an entirely viable contention that the "scheme of ordered
liberty," sanctioned in much earlier cases, forbade this nearly complete
destruction of the privacy of marriage, in the interest of the conduct
of ordinary litigation.
The reasonableness of this Rule may be tested by sampling the
quality of some of the arguments tendered by the Advisory Committee
5. Ed. Note: The Supreme Court of New Mexico has adopted this definition of
the marital privilege. 4 N.M. STAT. ANe. 20-4-505 (Supp. 1973). In Wisconsin, how-
ever, the court specifically foresaw this near-elimination of privacy and modified Rule
505 to protect "any private communication by one to the other made during their mar-
riage." 20L Wis. STAT. ANN. 905.05 (1974).
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in its defense." The marital privilege is downgraded, for example, by
contrasting the marriage relation with other relations to which privilege
is accorded, on the ground forsooth, that those other relations are
"essentially and almost exclusively verbal in nature, quite unlike
marriage." [Emphasis supplied.] Does this mean, can it be meant,
that the marriage relation is entitled to the less protection because its
parties sleep together, found and maintain a home together, raise
children together, besides talking to each other? But if not that, what
is meant?
It is said, further, that these other, favored relations "have as one
party a professional person who can be expected to inform the other
person of the existence of the privilege." What is the sequence of
thought here? Why should the confidentiality of a relation be favored
simply because knowledge of this confidential character is more likely
to come to the parties? Is it so obvious that the effect of prior knowl-
edge on conduct is'the one and only reason for respecting the privacies
of human life? Is it not the intrinsically private character of the rela-
tion,. and the reciprocal indecency of invading that privacy, rather -than
the parties' knowledge of the law of evidence, that chiefly justifies con-
fidentiality? I really cannot see the firm outline of a thought here. I
would understand what was meant if it were said that the confidenti-
ality of some relationship ought not to be protected, on the ground that
warning of this non-confidential character could easily be communi-
cated to the parties. I suspect that somebody has just turned this intel-
ligible thought around verbally, without noticing -that it doesn't work
in reverse. If there is in any sense a substance in the argument as
proffered, the solution would be to maintain the marital privilege, and
to disseminate more widely, knowledge of its existence.
Very plainly, the question of the obnoxiousness of this Rule to ob-
jections rooted in the constitutional law of privacy is a grave question;
there are few graver. • Now is not the time to argue this question in full.
But now is the time to decide that if it must arise, it ought to come
before a Court which has not already decided it, in effect, by issuing
this Rule, but which does not so much as claim to have issued this Rule
after full judicial consideration of its four-square constitutionality-a
claim which would in any case be a claim of the impossible, since the
conditions for proper judicial consideration of issues of constitutional
law exist only in real law-suits.
Hardly less grave is the invasion of central human privacy involved
in the root-and-branch abolition of the physician-patient privilege.6
6. Ed. Note: The rules proposed by the Supreme Court and adopted by New Mex-
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The question here is not only whether people might be discouraged
from making full communication to physicians, though it seems flatly
impossible that this would not sometimes happen-a consideration
which would in itself be enough to make incomprehensible -the absolute
subordination of this privacy interest to any 'trivial interest arising in
litigation. But evaluation of a rule like this entails not only a guess
as to what conduct it will motivate, but also an estimate of its intrinsic
decency. All of us would consider it indecent for a doctor, in the
course, say, of a television interview, or even in a textbook, -to tell all
he knows, naming names, about patients who have ,been treated by
him. Why does this judgment of decency altogether vanish from sight,
sink to absolute zero, as soon as somebody files -any kind of a non-
demurrable complaint in a federal court? Here, again, can a rule be
a good one when the ethical doctor must violate it, or hedge, or evade?
In Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), the late Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, for the Court, condemned as utterly indecent the forced
pumping of a man's stomach to get criminal evidence. Does not the
forced revealing of every medical and personal fact, stomach contents
and all, learned by the doctor of a person not even suspected of any-
thing, just to serve the convenience of any litigant, partake at least a
little of the same indecency? Do not these and many other considera-
tions lead to the discernment of constitutional as well as of policy issues
here? If so, then the same remarks as those made above apply to the
posture in which those constitutional issues are put by the promulgation
of these Rules.
(It should be noted that, in an inverted way, the Advisory Com-
mittee recognizes that its abolition of this privilege is retrograde, since
many states have created it by statute. These statutes often contain
exceptions; the reasonableness of these-and some do seem reasonable
-is not in issue here.)
I must go on to note how strangely inconsistent these Rules are
with respect to the matter of privilege. The inconsistencies are so re-
markable as to raise constitutional doubts on the score of arbitrariness.
First, though no privilege whatever is to inhere in the physician-
patient relation as such, Rule 504 extends a fairly ample privilege to
ico, 4 N.M. STAT. ANN. 20-4-504 (1973), protect only those statements made by a pa-
tient to his doctor about his emotional or mental condition. The privilege is properly
labeled the psychotherapist privilege. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, anticipating the
problems involved in limiting the physician privilege, extended protection to communica-
tions by the patient about his physical condition as well. 20L WIs. STAT. ANN. 905.04
(1974).
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communications of patient -to psychotherapist. If a man, consulting a
heart specialist, reveals in the course of his case-history interview, that
he has had gonorrhea, then the cardiologist must divulge this in court,
whenever and wherever any litigant needs the revelation. If a man
under therapy for psychoneurosis reveals that his having had gonorrhea
has filled him with guilt, that communication is protected. This is pre-
posterous. It is a case of the tail ceasing to wag the dog, and continu-
ing to wag in place after the dog has gone away. Psychotherapy is
privileged, and ought -to be amply privileged, exactly because it is a
kind of medicine, and a human being ought to be able to consult any
kind of a doctor without by that act, or by the necessities of communi-
cation consequent on that -act, rendering himself vulnerable to being
stripped -to and below -the skin in public. There is no ground whatever
for singling out psychotherapy for special treatment. Any patient has
to reveal his condition, verbally or otherwise, in order to be treated
effectively. Moreover, for what it is worth, most competent doctors
of all sorts very often concern themselves with emotional conditions.
Another strange anomaly, at least in the foothills of due-process
arbitrariness, is found in the according of a privilege -to "Communica-
tions to Clergymen" (Rule 506) while marital confidentiality is abol-
ished. The one and only distinction here is -the almost ludicrously
counterpersuasive one discussed above-that confession and its ana-
logues, unlike marriage are "purely verbal." Brushing aside this non-
ground of distinction, one is bound to see "establishment of religion"
issues, as well as issues of capricious arbitrariness, in the Rules' pre-
ferring ,the occasional or even casual "spiritual" relationship to the deep
spiritual tie between husband and wife.
I have saved to last the lawyer-client privilege (Rule 503). You
and I are both lawyers, and we understand the necessity for this privi-
lege. But, as a lawyer, I own I find it embarrassing that a group of
lawyers, having so summarily dealt with the privacies of marriage and
of medicine, proceed, without any satisfactory explanation of the vast
difference, to shield our own profession so amply. I wonder what kind
of Rules we would have gotten if ,the doctors had drawn them.
One final clarification: I am not against any of these privileges.
I believe in the attorney, clergyman, and psychotherapist privileges in
all their width; if anything, I would widen them, for I believe many
human interests are more important than the conduct of whatever liti-
gation may from time -to time arise. I am concerned only with the en-
tirely unwarranted contrast between the treatment of these and the
treatment of what are perhaps the most private and the second most
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private relations in life-marriage, and the relation of doctor to patient.
If these central citadels fall, then, a fortiori, little of human privacy has
warrant to claim protection.
(I have not discussed the "trade secret" privilege (Rule 508); its
juxtaposition with the treatment given marriage sounds a rather sordid
note. The "state secrets" privilege (Rule 509) raises issues rather re-
mote from my present central point.)
At a time, then, when constitutional law is reaching out more and
more to protect the privacies of men and women, these privilege Rules
are astonishingly regressive, and raise serious constitutional issues.
After all is said, my contention in chief is that these constitutional is-
sues, if they have to come -to court, ought to come there utterly and
visibly unprejudiced-and that the lower courts (where in practice,
many such questions will be resolved, at least for a long interim) not
be or seem to be bound by the prior Supreme Court sanction which
these Rules carry. These privilege Rules present a clear case in which
scrupulous separation of powers is of the most solemn practical mo-
ment. If, in times like these, it is -to be determined that the central
human privacies are to be further weakened by rules of evidence in
the federal courts, then let that determination be made, in full fact as
well as in tenuous theory, by the Congress-so -that the Supreme Court,
when it decides whether the Constitution permits such weakening, may
write on an absolutely clean slate.
That result, plainly a sound one, can now only be attained by Con-
gress' rejecting these Rules, and I urge upon your Committee that it
recommend that this be done.7
I hope this letter can be made a part of the Record of Hearings.
Is/Charles L. Black, Jr.
Luce Professor of Jurisprudence
7. Ed. Note: Congress agreed with Professor Black's recommendation. See note
4 supra and accompanying text.
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